# Bertrand Game for the Classroom — Price War, Played Live

Source: https://decka.dev/classroom/economics/bertrand-game

Two firms choose prices for identical crates. The lower price serves demand; tied firms split whole units equally, leaving any remainder unsold. Play two rounds, inspect sales and profits, then test whether a different permitted price would have paid more.

## What it teaches

Compare price competition with quantity competition while holding the stock demand and cost assumptions fixed. The textbook price-at-cost result is a theoretical reference, not a prediction that two classroom rounds must reach it. Students test unilateral price changes against their rival’s actual price, accounting for this game’s whole-pound prices, whole-unit demand and tie rule.

## What is the Bertrand game?

Bertrand competition changes the firms’ choice from quantity to price. For identical goods, the lower-priced firm serves the market’s demand. The familiar continuous-price model uses this undercutting incentive to explain the price-at-marginal-cost benchmark. This classroom version uses discrete prices and quantities, so check the permitted alternatives rather than treating that benchmark as its only possible outcome.

The stock activity pairs firms for two rounds with demand Q = max(0, floor((100 − price) / 1)) and a production cost of twenty pounds per crate. Prices are whole pounds from zero to one hundred. If both firms name the lowest price, each sells the same whole-number share of demand; an odd leftover unit remains unsold. Profit is (price − unit cost) × units sold, so sales below cost can lose money. The boards reveal the markets that settled, not a predetermined price war; a market missing a firm’s decision is not settled by inventing an answer.

## Classroom debrief

Which firms sold units, and which did not? With the rival’s price fixed, would a permitted undercut, tie or price increase improve your profit?

How did your prices compare with marginal cost? If you also played Cournot, what changed in the decisions and outcomes, and what stayed the same?

Could whole-pound price steps or the unsold tie remainder affect a best response? What might change with differentiated products or different demand?

## Bertrand game questions, answered

### What happens when both firms set the same price?

They divide demand equally in whole units, with any remainder unsold. For example, at the stock price of twenty-one pounds, demand is seventy-nine crates: each tied firm sells thirty-nine and one crate remains unsold. Compare the profit from a permitted undercut, not just its higher sales volume.

### Why do the numbers match the Cournot game?

The stock versions share the demand intercept, slope and production cost. One asks firms for quantities; the other asks for prices. That gives a useful classroom comparison, but it does not guarantee different prices or make two class sessions a controlled empirical experiment. Check any teacher-customized assumptions before comparing them.

### Is the price really expected to hit cost?

No classroom outcome is guaranteed. Price at marginal cost is the textbook reference, and this game’s price grid and tie rounding matter when checking a deviation. An above-cost result alone does not establish tacit collusion. Compare the actual decisions and test whether either firm could earn more by changing only its permitted price.

## Run the lesson

Present the boards in PowerPoint, Google Slides and Decka. Students scan a QR code or open the session link to join from their phone browsers.
