# Trust Game for the Classroom — Send It and See, Live

Source: https://decka.dev/classroom/economics/trust-game

Whatever you send your partner is multiplied on the way over — and then it is entirely theirs. Nothing makes them return a coin. Played twice with the same person, tripled and then doubled, with the room's returns on the projector.

## What it teaches

The trust game puts a number on trust and on trustworthiness separately: the sender's transfer measures one, the returned share measures the other, and the multiplier makes trust efficient — the pair is richest when everything is sent — while backward induction says none of it should happen. Students watch the room beat that prediction, partially, and then argue about which part: reciprocity, reputation, or the second round with the same partner.

## What is the trust game?

The trust game — Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe's investment game — is how experimental economics measures trust without asking anyone about it. A sender passes some amount to a partner; it is multiplied in transit; the partner returns whatever share they choose, including none. Every step is voluntary and the last mover has no material reason to return a coin — so a strictly self-interested chain reasons backwards to zero: nothing returned, therefore nothing sent, therefore the multiplier's free value is left on the table.

Decades of experiments say people send, and people return, and this activity lets your room join the data. Each pair plays twice with the same partner — the transfer tripled the first time, doubled the second — and the projector shows what went out against what came back, which is what trust was worth in this room, in coins. The same-partner design sharpens the debrief: how much of the first round's generosity was reciprocity, and how much was an investment in the second?

## Classroom debrief

The theory says send nothing, because nothing obliges a return. What did the room actually do, and what does that break in the argument?

Senders: what were you buying with a large transfer? Returners: what did you feel you owed, and why owe anything?

Round two was doubled instead of tripled. Did thinner growth make the room more careful with its trust, or less?

## Trust game questions, answered

### Is the partner really free to return nothing?

Completely. The return is an open choice, not a rule — that absence of enforcement is the point, because whatever comes back was given, not owed. A version where returns were compelled would measure compliance, not trust.

### Why the same partner twice, when the ultimatum game uses strangers?

Opposite designs for opposite questions. The ultimatum game isolates fairness by removing any future between players; this pairing keeps the future in, so the room can argue about how much round-one generosity was reciprocity and how much was reputation-building — with its own round-two data as evidence.

### Why does the multiplier drop from three to two?

It moves the efficiency of trust without touching its logic. Nothing about the strategic problem changes — the last mover still owes nothing — but the value created by trusting shrinks, and the room gets to see whether its trust was principled or price-sensitive.

## Run the lesson

Present the boards in PowerPoint, Google Slides and Decka. Students scan a QR code or open the session link to join from their phone browsers.
